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Abstract 
We use the 2006 relaxation of constraints on patient choice of hospital in the English NHS to 
investigate the effect of hospital competition on dimensions of efficiency including indicators 
of resource management (admissions per bed, bed occupancy rate, proportion of day cases, and 
cancelled elective operations) and costs (reference cost index for overall and elective activity, 
cleaning services costs, laundry and linen costs). We employ a quasi differences-in-differences 
approach and estimate seemingly unrelated regressions and unconditional quantile regressions 
with data on hospital trusts from 2002/03 to 2010/11. Our findings suggest that increased 
competition had mixed effects on efficiency. An additional equivalent rival increased 
admissions per bed by 1.1%, admissions per doctor by 0.9% and the proportion of day cases 
by 0.38 percentage points, but it also increased the number of cancelled elective operations by 
2.5%. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The efficiency of health care systems is a key goal for policy makers across OECD 
countries. Some of these, such as Australia, England, and Nordic countries, pursue greater 
efficiency by stimulating hospital competition through policies that give individuals the right 
to choose among hospitals (Cookson and Dawson, 2012, Propper, 2012, Palangkaraya and 
Yong, 2013). 
In this study, we use the 2006 English National Health Service (NHS) relaxation of 
constraints on patient choice of hospital to investigate whether there was any effect of the 
exposure to greater competition on hospital efficiency. The aim of the reform was to induce 
hospitals to compete on quality and to enhance efficiency. Theory suggests that, under a DRG-
type payment system, patient choice could increase or reduce efficiency. Increases in patient 
choice which induce higher quality may lead to a greater volume of patients and this increases 
incentives to improve efficiency by containing costs to increase the profit margin on each extra 
patient (Ma, 1994). But making an additional effort to increase quality may divert effort from 
cost-containment effort (Brekke et al., 2012). 
The previous empirical literature (reviewed briefly in Section 1.2) focuses on unit costs and 
length of stay (e.g Cooper et al., 2012, Gaynor et al., 2013). We examine a wider subset of 
efficiency dimensions. Hospitals may increase efficiency by treating more patients for a given 
mix of inputs. We therefore examine admissions per bed, admissions per doctor, and 
admissions per nurse. Hospitals may also increase bed occupancy, reduce cancelled elective 
operations, and increase the proportion of day cases. We also consider unit costs, which we 
PHDVXUHWKURXJKWKHUHIHUHQFHFRVWLQGH[5&,ZKLFKFRPSDUHVDKRVSLWDO¶VWRWDOFRVWVZLWK
the national average total costs for the same mix of services and is used by policy makers to 
assess hospital efficiency (Department of Health, 2014c). Since hospitals may also become 
more efficient via better management of amenities, we also analyse costs for cleaning services, 
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linen and laundry, and the percentage of untouched meals. Section 1.3 provides a short 
analytical framework to place our set of efficiency indicators in context. 
We analyse public hospitals for financial years 2002/03 to 2010/11. Like Cooper et al. 
(2012) and Gaynor et al. (2013), we use WKHµ3DWLHQW&KRLFH¶UHIRUPDVDQDWXUDOH[SHULPHQW
and use a quasi differences-in-differences approach. This empirical strategy exploits the 
variation in market structure facing different hospitals, under the plausible argument that 
hospitals in more competitive areas are more likely to change their behaviour after the 
relaxation of constraints on patient choice of provider. Unlike previous efficiency studies, we 
estimate the quasi differences-in-differences regressions for our eleven efficiency indicators 
simultaneously through Seemingly Unrelated Regressions or SUR (Zellner, 1962, 1963) to 
improve the precision of the estimates, since hospital efficiency outcomes are potentially 
correlated. We also use the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) approach suggested by 
Firpo et al. (2009) to investigate whether the effect of competition varies for more or less 
efficient hospitals. &RPSHWLWLRQLVPHDVXUHGWKURXJKWKHµHTXLYDOHQW¶QXPEHURIULYDOVZKLFK
is calculated as the inverse of Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). 
Our findings suggest that competition has mixed effects on efficiency. Post Choice policy, 
one more equivalent rival increases efficiency as measured by admissions per bed by 1.1%, 
admissions per doctor by 0.9%, and the proportion of day cases increases by 0.38 percentage 
points, while it decreases the proportion of untouched meals by 0.35 percentage points. We 
estimate that these effects produce cost savings of £2.2m for the average hospital, which is 
about 1% of total hospital costs. But offsetting this, the policy change increased the number of 
cancelled elective operations by 2.5%. We found no statistically significant effects on the other 
five efficiency indicators (bed occupancy, cleaning services costs, laundry and linen costs, and 
RCI for all admissions and for elective admissions). 
SUR had better explanatory power than OLS and standard errors are smaller in most cases. 
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The UQR results indicate a mixed relationship between the level of efficiency and the effect of 
the choice reform. For instance, one more equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 
2.2% for hospitals with fewer admissions per bed (25th quantile), and there is no statistically 
significant effect for hospitals with more admissions per bed (50th, 75th, or 90th quantile). But 
one more equivalent rival increases admissions per doctor by 1.8% for hospitals with more 
admissions per doctor (75th quantile), but it has no statistical effect on hospitals with fewer 
admissions per doctor (10th or 25th quantile). 
The next three sections briefly describe the related literature, the institutional background 
in the English NHS, and the analytical framework. Section 2 explains the econometric strategy. 
Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 provides the results. Section 5 concludes. 
1.1. Related studies 
A number of empirical studies investigate the effect of competition on efficiency in the US 
(Gaynor and Town, 2011). Early studies suggest that hospital competition leads to an 
inefficient use of resources under a retrospective payment system (e.g. Joskow, 1980, Robinson 
and Luft, 1985).1 Later studies find evidence of lower hospital costs in more competitive areas 
after the introduction of prospective payment system and managed care (Zwanziger and 
Melnick, 1988, Bamezai et al., 1999).2 For example, Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler 
and Geppert (2005), find that hospital competition has a welfare-enhancing effect by reducing 
costs and increasing quality for patients who had a heart attack. 
For the UK, Söderlund et al. (1997) find no association between competition and unit cost 
after the introduction of the NHS internal market.3 Gaynor et al. (2013) focus on a more recent 
                                                 
1
 A retrospective payment system reimburses hospitals for the actual costs incurred for each patient.  
2
 In 1982, hospitals in California were paid a fixed price for each patient treated, and new pro-competition laws 
allowed insurance companies to offer patients health care plans after negotiating the price with providers. 
3
 The NHS internal market reform was introduced in 1991 and it stimulated competition by separating the roles 
of financier and supplier of health care services. Suppliers (hospitals trusts) had to compete to secure contracts, 
and therefore income, offered by the purchaser. The internal market was abolished in 1997. 
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reform that aimed at stimulating competition among hospitals through the relaxation of 
constraints on patient choice of hospital. The authors implement a quasi differences-in-
differences estimator and find that competition reduced length of stay but did not change 
expenditure per admission.4 Cooper et al. (2012) also exploit the Patient Choice reform and 
find that it reduced the pre-surgery length of stay of elective procedures such as hip and knee 
replacement, hernia repair, and arthroscopy more in competitive areas. Similarly, Bloom et al. 
(2015) use an instrumental variables strategy on a cross-section of hospitals in 2006 and find 
that competition reduces average length of stay. 
Our study contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we use a wider set of efficiency 
indicators. We include measures of resource management (such as admissions per bed, per 
doctor and per nurse, bed occupancy rate, cancelled operations, proportion of day cases and 
untouched meals), and measures of cost (such as cleaning services costs and laundry and linen 
costs, and the RCI as an alternative indicator). Second, we estimate the regressions for our 
indicators simultaneously to account for correlations across the error terms. Third, we test 
whether the effect of competition on efficiency varies at different quantiles of the efficiency 
distribution using the UQR estimator of Firpo et al. (2009). 
1.2. Institutional background 
The English NHS provides healthcare which is universal, tax financed, and free at the point 
of use. The Department of Health distributes capitated funding to around 150 local health 
authorities, which use it to pay for secondary health care provided to NHS patients by public 
and private hospitals. Public hospitals are run by NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts, the 
latter having greater financial autonomy. Some NHS hospital trusts are teaching trusts 
providing research and teaching, and some are specialist trusts focusing on a limited range of 
                                                 
4
 Gaynor et al. (2013) study other aspect of hospital performance such as total number of admissions, total number 
and share of elective admissions, and total expenditure. They also investigate the effect of competition on quality 
as measured by heart attack and overall mortality. 
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conditions or client groups. Private hospitals are small, with no more than 50 beds, and overall 
provide about 6.5% of hospital beds (Boyle, 2011). 
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff 
Payment System. This is based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), a patient classification 
system similar to the American Diagnosis-Related Group. HRGs are groups of patients who 
are homogeneous with respect to diagnoses, procedures, and some patient characteristics. A 
fixed tariff is calculated for each HRG group as its national cost averaged across providers, but 
with adjustments for individual hospitals to reflect exogenous variations in input prices and the 
higher costs of specialised care (Department of Health, 2013b). 
+RVSLWDOFRPSHWLWLRQKDVEHHQHQFRXUDJHGE\UHOD[LQJUHVWULFWLRQVRQSDWLHQWV¶FKRLFHRI
hospital for elective care. Before 2006, elective patients were mainly restricted to the set of 
hospitals in contract with their local health authority. In 2006, patients were given the right to 
be offered a choice of at least four hospitals for elective care. Since 2008, patients have been 
allowed to choose any qualified provider (Department of Health, 2009). Choice is facilitated 
WKURXJKWKHZHEVLWHµ1+6&KRLFHV¶ZKLFKSURYLGHVLQIRUPDWLRQRQsome aspects of hospital 
performance (e.g. mortality, waiting times). 
1.3. Analytical framework 
The production function of a hospital is Y = f(K,L,e), where Y is the number of admissions, 
K is capital, L is labour, and e is managerial effort. Simple productivity measures are capital or 
labour productivity, given respectively by Y/K or Y/L. We can proxy Y/K with admissions per 
bed, and Y/L with admissions per doctor or per nurse. Ceteris paribus increases in managerial 
effort e will increase both productivity measures. 
Managerial effort e can be proxied by the proportion of day cases and bed occupancy rates. 
For example, managers can encourage doctors to discharge the patient on the same day by 
ensuring suitable patients are admitted early in the morning and care is provided within the 
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day. Managers may improve also admission and discharge procedures through better planning 
to ensure beds are not left unoccupied and elective operations are not cancelled. 
If r and w are the unit costs of capital and labour, the cost is C = rK+wL. If input use 
increases proportionately with output, the cost function can be written as C(Y) = c(r,w,e)Y, 
where c(·) is the unit cost of treatment. Therefore, costs will also be a function of managerial 
effort. We measure costs at aggregate level and for specific services such as cleaning services 
and laundry and linen services, which are plausibly unaffected by factors that drive the costs 
of providing medical care such as the volumes of doctors and nurses. 
There may be negative spillover effects across efficiency dimensions and from efficiency 
to quality. For example, higher bed occupancy rates may lead to more cancelled elective 
operations. In addition to improving productivity and reducing costs, managerial effort may 
also have an impact on quality of services and allocative efficiency. For example, managers 
PD\EHWWHUPRQLWRUSDWLHQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVRQPHDOVWRUHGXFHZDVWHV5 It is therefore useful to 
examine the effects of competition and choice policy on a wide range of efficiency and cost 
measures.  
A theory model on the effect of competition on efficiency (Appendix A3) shows that 
competition could either increase or reduce efficiency. Hospital markets are oligopolistic with 
typically only a limited number of providers in each local market. More competition increases 
demand responsiveness to quality so that hospitals have a stronger incentive to attract patients 
based on clinical and non-clinical aspects of qualities (e.g. amenities). A change in the volume 
of patients induced by patient choice may also affect efficiency because some managerial 
                                                 
5
 If hospitals reduce untouched meals by providing food of higher quality, then costs may increase but patient 
satisfaction will increase as well which, in turn, may stimulate demand. The reduction of untouched meals and 
improving standard of foods and drinks in NHS hospitals are policy targets (Department of Health, 2005, 2014a). 
A recent cost-benefit analysis commissioned by the Department of Health (Department of Health, 2014b) suggests 
that improved practices in the management of hospital food (e.g. use of menu planning software, implementation 
of waste policy and audit) may produce savings through enhanced catering efficiency and reduced patient length 
of stay. 
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efforts, say to improve purchasing procedures, will yield bigger returns on a larger pool of 
patients. 
 METHODS 
To assess the impact of the Patient Choice reform on efficiency, we estimate the baseline 
Model I: 
 2006/07kt k t kt t k kty M d XP E T O D Ht       (1) 
where ykt is an efficiency indicator for hospital k=1«N in year t=2002/«/11; µ is 
the intercept;   2005/062002/031 prek k kttM T M  ¦  measures the average pre-reform market structure of 
hospital k, with Mkt being the market structure of hospital k in year t and Tkpre the number of 
pre-reform years for hospital k; dt2006/07 is a dummy equal to one from year 2006/07 onwards, 
when the policy was introduced; Xkt is a vector of hospital-level control variables (e.g. 
percentage of male patients, patient age); Ȝt are year dummies to account for time trends (e.g. 
of technical progress); Įk are hospital fixed effects to allow for time-invariant unobserved 
factors, and İkt is an idiosyncratic error term. We use kM  instead of Mkt to avoid potential 
endogeneity due to, for example, DKRVSLWDO¶Vquality and efficiency affecting the entry of rivals 
after the reform. 
Model I is a quasi differences-in-differences regression because it uses a variable with 
differing treatment intensity rather than a treatment or control group (Angrist and Pischke, 
2008, p. 175). The idea is that the patient choice policy has a greater effect in areas with more 
providers (i.e. more competitive areas). The English NHS fits this empirical strategy because 
of the high geographical variation in the English hospital market structure.6 
The coefficient ȕ in Model I is our differences-in-differences estimator indicating whether 
                                                 
6
 For instance, hospitals in London generally compete with more than ten rivals within a radius of 30 km but some 
hospitals in the North East of England do not face any rival within the same radius. 
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the effect of the relaxation of patient choice constraints on efficiency varies with competition. 
If ȕ!0 then hospitals in more competitive areas experience a greater increase in the efficiency 
indicator compared to hospitals in less competitive areas. ȕ is identified under the common 
trend assumption (i.e. efficiency in both more competitive and less competitive areas follow 
the same trend in the absence of the reform). 
We estimate Model I for eleven efficiency indicators. These outcomes are likely to be 
influenced by common unobservable factors (e.g. unmeasured patient characteristics) and to 
respond to exogenous shocks (e.g. introduction of a new medical technology). As a result, the 
error terms across the eleven regressions may be correlated. The single-equation OLS estimator 
neglects such correlations. We therefore also estimate Model I jointly for all the efficiency 
indicators as a SUR model. 
SUR and OLS are equivalent if there is no correlation between error terms (Zellner, 1962). 
Even when errors are correlated, SUR and OLS are equivalent if the covariates exhibit greater 
collinearity across regressions than within regressions. If covariate collinearity within 
regressions is greater than across regressions, SUR will still provide more efficient estimates 
(Baltagi, 2011, p. 245). This latter condition is likely to be met in our study because, although 
using mostly the same covariates across regressions, the inclusion of hospital dummies (i.e. the 
hospital fixed effects) may induce some collinearity within regressors, and also because of the 
heterogeneity of the different efficiency indicators we use.7 We estimate SUR by maximum 
likelihood and we cluster standard errors within hospitals to allow for the serial correlation of 
errors. We test the validity of SUR against OLS using a Breusch-Pagan (1979) test for 
correlation between error terms. 
                                                 
7
 Intuitively, by using a lot of different efficiency indicators, the conditional mean function of each indicator is 
likely to be affected differently by covariates, choice policy and hospital fixed-effects, thus reducing the potential 
of collinearity across regression on different outcomes. 
8 
 
As in Kessler and McClellan (2000), we test whether the effect of the market structure on 
efficiency is non-linear using Model II: 
 2006/07kt k t kt t k kty Q d XP E T O D Ht      , (2) 
where Qk is a vector of three dummies constructed on the quartile of the pre-reform market 
structure ( kM ) distribution. The first quartile (hospitals subject to the lowest competition) is 
the reference category. 
We also estimate Model III which allows for time-varying market structure: 
 2006/07kt kt t kt kt t k kty M d M XP E G T O D Ht       . (3) 
The coefficient ȕ in equation (3) has the same interpretation as in Model I, while į captures the 
effect of competition in the pre-reform period. 
As an additional robustness check, we implement Model IV, a more flexible version of 
Model III, which allows ȕ to vary in each period as follows: 
 kt t kt kt kt t k kty PM M XP E U T O D H       , (4) 
where Pt is a vector of year dummies, excluding year 2005/06. This model provides information 
on the evolution of the effect of competition on efficiency in each pre- and post-reform year. 
We expect a greater effect of competition on efficiency in the post-reform years than in the 
pre-reform years. 
All the above models focus on the effect of competition on average efficiency. But there 
may be more scope for competition to affect efficiency when efficiency is low. To investigate 
this, we implement in Model V the UQR approach suggested by Firpo et al. (2009): 
   2006/07kt k t kt t k ktR y M d XW W W WP E T O D Ht      , (5) 
where RĲ(ykt) is the Ĳth unconditional quantile of the efficiency indicator distribution.8 Estimates 
                                                 
8More formally, RĲ(ykt) is the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) calculated as RIF(ykt;qĲ)=qĲ+(Ĳ-1[yktqĲ])/fy(qĲ), 
where qĲ is the Ĳth quantile of ykt, 1[yktqĲ] is a dummy equal to one when ykt is below qĲ, and fy(qĲ) is the estimated 
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from this approach have an interpretation similar to model I: ȕĲ>0 indicates that, as a result of 
the choice policy, hospitals in the Ĳth unconditional quantile of the efficiency indicator 
distribution and located in more competitive areas experience a greater increase in the 
efficiency indicator compared to similar hospitals located in less competitive areas.9 We focus 
on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th unconditional quantiles and we bootstrap clustered standard 
errors using 1,000 replications.10 
 DATA 
3.1. Efficiency indicators 
We have eleven efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 2010/11 (See Appendix Table A4 
for sources). As measures of resource management we use the number of admissions per bed, 
admissions per doctor, and admissions per nurse. Other indicators of resource management are 
bed occupancy rate and number of cancelled elective operations for non-clinical reasons, and 
proportion of day cases and proportion of untouched meals. We also use cost indicators 
including the overall reference cost index (RCI) and the elective RCI, cleaning services costs 
and laundry and linen costs. 
3.2. Measure of hospital market structure 
We measure market structure as the equivalent number of rival hospitals, including both 
                                                 
density function at qĲ. The density function is estimated assuming a Gaussian kernel and using the optimal 
bandwidth that minimises the mean integrated squared error. 
9
 Using UQRs to evaluate the effect of a change in policy provides several advantages compared to the alternative 
approach of conditional quantile regressions (CQR) introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). In CQRs, the 
covariates have the effect of redefining the quantiles of the dependent variable distribution (Borah and Basu, 
2013): a hospital in the top of the efficiency indicator distribution may end up in the bottom of the conditional 
distribution. Hence, we cannot conclude whether explanatories have bigger or smaller effects on hospitals in 
particular quantiles. A further limitation of the conditional quantile approach concerns fixed effects, which must 
be treated as pure location shifters that remain constant across quantiles (e.g. Canay, 2011). This might be a strong 
assumption in empirical applications. In our case, for example, fixed effects are likely to capture unobserved 
case-mix, which needs to yield the same effect on the outcome for all hospitals, regardless of their conditional 
efficiency. 
10
 We perform all estimations in Stata. We fit SUR through the command gsem. The unconditional quantile 
regression is implemented using xtrifreg (Borgen, 2016). 
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public and private providers. We calculate the HHI for hospital k as: 
  2k ko o ko oko o kHHI S HHI S S  ¦ ¦ ¦  (6) 
where Sko is the predicted market share of hospital k¶VSDWLHQWVOLYLQJLQQHLJKERXrhood o within 
30 km; and HHIo is the concentration of patients across neighbourhoods, calculated through 
the predicted share of patients living in neighbourhood o admitted to hospital k (Sok).11 The 
hospital HHI (HHIk) can be interpreted as a weighted average of the neighbourhood HHI 
(HHIoZKLFKKHOSVWRLGHQWLI\HDFKKRVSLWDO¶VPDUNHW12 The inverse of hospital HHI (HHIkí1) 
is the number of equal sized rivals which would produce the same HHI. The equivalent number 
of rivals is constructed from HHIs using data from Hospital Episode Statistics (Gravelle et al., 
2014) to predict patient choice of provider with models in which choice of provider is not 
affected by provider quality, as in Kessler and McClellan (2000).13 
3.3. Control variables 
We include as control variables: the percentage of male patients, percentage of patients 
between 15 and 59, 60 and 74, and older than 74 years (the reference category is the age range 
between 0 and 14), and percentage of emergency admissions. We also use a dummy for 
Foundation Trusts. In addition, we control for exogenous variation in input prices (e.g. nurses, 
buildings) through the market forces factor (MFF) index collected from the reference cost 
database. We also add the number of beds to the regressions for cancelled elective operations, 
                                                 
11
 The patient share Sok is the ratio between the number of hospital k¶VSDWLHQWVOLYLQJLQQHLJKERXUKRRGo (Iko) and 
the number of patients living in neighbourhood o (Io), while Sko is computed by dividing Iko by the number of 
hospital k¶VSDWLHQWVIk). 
12
 The neighbourhood is a small geographical area with on average 1,500 inhabitants. 
13
 Predicted patient flows are from a Poisson choice model for each year:  | , ,ko ko k oI distanceE Qz
 21 2 3exp ko ko k odistance distanceI I c c   z QI F where Iko is the number of hospital k¶V SDWLHQWV OLYLQJ LQ
neighbourhood o, distanceko is the distance between small area o¶VFHQWURLGDQGKRVSLWDOk located within 30 km, 
zk is a vector of hospital type dummies, and Qo is a vector of small area dummies. 
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cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs. 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The sample includes between 143 (laundry and linen 
costs) and 173 (RCI) hospital trusts observed on average for just under 9 years. In each year, 
there are on average 110 admissions per bed, 185 admissions per doctor, and 69 admissions 
per nurse. The bed occupancy rate is 86%. 30.7% of patients are on average admitted as day 
cases, and hospitals cancel on average 359 elective operations in a year. On average, 7.6% of 
meals served to patients remain untouched, the cleaning services and the laundry and linen 
costs are respectively £2,842 thousands and £807 thousands. The reference cost indexes are 
100 by construction: a RCI greater than 100 indicates that a hospitDO¶VWRWDOFRVWVDUHJUHDWHU
than the national average total costs for the same HRG groups.14 Correlations amongst the 
efficiency indicators are generally low and mostly below 30% in absolute value (Appendix 
Table A1). 
Figure 1 shows the trend in some efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 2010/11. 
Admissions per bed, admissions per nurse, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs 
trended upward over the period whilst admissions per doctor and percentage of untouched 
meals fell. Bed occupancy rate, rate of day cases, and cancelled elective operations increased 
after 2006/07. 
Table 1 also has descriptive statistics on explanatories and shows that there is considerable 
variation in the key number of equivalent rivals. 
                                                 
14
 Appendix Table A2 provides the unconditional quantiles of the efficiency indicators. 
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 RESULTS 
4.1. Model results 
Table 2 has the SUR results for Model I.15 The key coefficient in the first row indicates 
whether the effect of competition on efficiency changed after the policy. Efficiency increased 
according to nine of the 11 indicators and fell for two (cancelled operations, cleaning service 
costs). The increases in efficiency are statistically significant at the 5% level for four indicators: 
post policy one more equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 1%, admissions per 
doctor by 0.9%, and the proportion of day cases by 0.38 percentage points, and reduces the 
proportion of untouched meals by 0.35 percentage points. One of the reductions in efficiency 
(cancelled operations) is also statistically significant: one more equivalent rival increases 
cancelled elective operations by 2.5%. 
Table 3 shows that an additional equivalent rival increases admissions by 0.6% and 
decreases the numbers of beds and doctors by 0.5% and 0.4%, although the effects are not 
statistically significant.16 These results support those on admissions per bed and admissions per 
doctor in Table 2 since an increase in admissions and a reduction in the number of beds or 
doctors imply increases in admission per bed and per doctor. 
Table 4 has the key results for Model II, in which the policy break dummy is interacted 
with three dummies for the three upper quartiles of the equivalent number of rivals. The 
estimates suggest that the choice policy has a greater effect on efficiency for hospitals in the 
two higher quartiles of competition. 
Table 5 reports results for Model III and IV. Model III estimates the effect of market 
                                                 
15
 The p-value for the Breusch-Pagan test for correlation among the error terms across regressions suggests that 
SUR yields more precise estimates than OLS for Model I and for Models II, III, and IV. 
16
 Appendix Table A3 provides the results on admissions, beds, doctors, and nurses for Model III and IV. We 
observe higher statistical significance in model IV for the effect of competition on beds: an additional equivalent 
rival significantly reduces beds by 0.6% in 2007/08, 0.8% in 2008/09, and 1.2% in 2010/11.  
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structure before and after change in choice policy. Compared to Model I, the key coefficient is 
unchanged for admissions per bed and proportion of day cases, but it is no longer significant 
at 5% level for admissions per doctor, cancelled elective operations and proportion of 
untouched meals. The association between competition and efficiency before the reform (į) is 
never statistically significant at 5% level. The association between competition and efficiency 
after the reform (ȕ+į) is significant only for the admissions per bed and admissions per doctor: 
an additional equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 1.5% (0.9%+0.6%) and 
admissions per doctor by 1.2% after the reform. 
Model IV allows the effect of competition on efficiency to vary by year. Considering the 
proportion of day cases, for example, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative and insignificant in the pre-reform periods, and increasingly positive and significant 
in the post-reform periods. Such estimates clearly indicate a persistent effect of the reform on 
efficiency as captured by the proportion of day cases. 
Table 6 has the UQR results. There is a mixed relationship between the effect of the choice 
policy change and whether the hospital was more or less efficient. Less efficient hospitals tend 
to have greater increases in efficiency in the case of admissions per bed, the percentage of day 
cases and, to a lesser extent, admissions per nurse and percentage of untouched meals. But in 
the cases of admissions per doctor and admissions per nurse it is the more efficient hospitals 
which respond more. 
4.2. Economic impacts 
We provide some back of the envelope calculations of the economic impacts of the patient 
choice policy on a subset of our efficiency indicators (Appendix A1 has details and 
explanations of why we do not attempt to estimate cost savings for all our efficiency indicators). 
From Model I in equation (1), the average effect of patient choice on a given efficiency 
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indicator is ME , where 3.7M   is the mean equivalent number of rivals in the pre-policy 
period (Table 1). 
Patient choice increased admissions per doctor by 3.3% (0.009×3.7). Since patient choice 
did not affect admissions (in Table 3 the effect on admissions is statistically insignificant), 
hospitals increase admissions per doctor by employing fewer doctors. Patient choice reduced 
the number of doctors by 1.5% (0.004×3.7; see Table 3). The average hospital has 420 doctors, 
and doctor average salary is £58,700 in the first quarter of 2011, so that the average hospital 
spends £24.654m on doctors. The average hospital annual cost savings from the reduction in 
the number of doctors are therefore £0.370m (1.5%×£24.654m). 
Patient choice increased the proportion of day cases by 1.4 percentage points (0.0038×3.7). 
On average, hospitals treat 73,651 patients each year. Since patient choice did not affect 
admissions, it increased the number of day cases by 1,031 (0.014×73,651). In 2010/11, the 
average cost of day cases was £670, and the average cost of elective patients with at least one 
overnight stay was £2,435. The savings from treating an elective patient as a day case is 
therefore £1,765 (£2,435í£670). Hence, the annual cost savings per hospital as a result of an 
increase in day cases are £1.820m (1,031×£1,765). 
Patient choice reduced the proportion of untouched meals by 1.3 percentage points 
(0.35×3.7). The average daily cost of feeding a patient is £8.29. Every day patients are served 
three meals and, therefore, the average cost of a meal is £2.76 (£8.29÷3). The average hospital 
has 686 beds, which are occupied 86% of the time (see Table 1). The total annual number of 
meals for the average hospital is 646,006 (686×0.86×3×365). Patient choice therefore reduced 
the number of untouched meals by 8,398 (646,006×0.013). Assuming that for each untouched 
meal hospitals serve a replacement meal of a similar cost that better fits SDWLHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHV, 
the annual savings from patient choice that arise from a reduction in the proportion of 
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untouched meals is £0.023m (8,398×£2.76). 
The annual total cost saving, from these three efficiency improvements is around £2.2m 
per hospital trust or £378m in total, around 1% of total hospital costs in 2010/11. This is not an 
estimate of the overall cost change from the change in patient choice policy since we only 
consider a subset of possible dimensions of efficiency. Moreover, data limitations prevent a 
full costing of all the effects on the changes in our subset of efficiency indicators, some of 
which implied reductions in efficiency and an increase in costs. However, our back of the 
envelope calculations for the indicators which we can cost suggest that, whilst the cost effects 
of changes in specific efficiency dimensions are relatively small as a proportion of total NHS 
costs, the overall efficiency effects of the choice policy change may be large enough to be of 
policy significance. 
 DISCUSSION 
We investigated whether competition improves some dimensions of hospital efficiency in 
England using the exogenous variation generated by the 2006 patient choice reform and the 
geographical variation in market structure. We find that greater competition led to 
improvements in four efficiency indicators (admissions per bed, admissions per doctor, 
proportion of day cases, and the proportion of untouched meals) but increased cancelled 
elective operations. The effect of the choice reform was larger for hospitals facing more rivals 
but there was no consistent relationship between the effect of the reform and initial hospital 
efficiency. 
Our results generally support the findings from other studies on English hospitals, which 
indicates a beneficial effect of competition on efficiency (e.g. Cooper et al., 2012). Our findings 
on admissions per bed and per doctor may help explain the reduction of beds and doctors in 
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NHS hospitals (Hosken, 2016, Matthews-King, 2018). The increase in the proportion of day 
cases after the choice reform is also largely coherent with the reduction in pre-surgery and 
overall length of stay on specific elective procedures found by Cooper et al. (2012). 
The reductions in beds and doctors per admission may have also brought hospitals closer 
to their full capacity. This may explain the increase in cancelled elective operations. Since NHS 
hospitals cannot refuse emergency patients, cancelling elective operations is an obvious way 
to react when demand exceeds capacity. Hospitals could also allow waiting times to increase 
but this route would have costs for managers because of the enforcement of strict waiting times 
targets (Propper et al., 2008). 
Under a relatively weak set of structural and distributional assumptions (i.e. the usual 
assumptions implicit in the SUR framework and differences-in-differences approach) our 
reduced form specification yields an unbiased estimate of the effects of competition on the 
specific efficiency measures. An alternative structural approach would enable us to examine 
the inter-relationships amongst the efficiency indicators, for example, between bed occupancy 
and cancelled operations. Such an approach, however, would require considerably stronger a-
priori assumptions or a large number of instrumental variables for the identification of the 
causal effects. 
Our analysis is based on an interesting but incomplete set of efficiency indicators and there 
may be reductions or increases in costs from changes in other indicators. A full cost-benefit 
analysis of the choice policy would also take account of the value of the change in quality it 
induced. Studies to date suggest that quality has improved for some conditions (Cooper et al., 
2011, Gaynor et al., 2013, Gravelle et al., 2014, Moscelli et al., 2018), but may have fallen for 
others (Moscelli et al., 2016, Skellern, 2017). Account must also be taken of the direct costs of 
implementing the policy change, such as some proportion of the £280m spent by the NHS up 
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to 2012 to set-up and run the electronic ³&KRRVH DQG %RRN´ V\VWHP WR IDFLOLWDWH SDWLHQWV¶
participation in their hospital referrals (Department of Health, 2013a, Dusheiko and Gravelle, 
2018). There are also other potentially welfare increasing policy tools available, such as direct 
financial incentives for providers (Meacock et al., 2014), regulation, targets (Propper et al., 
2008), and organisational and budgetary changes (Mason et al., 2015, Siciliani et al., 2017) 
which can be used as substitutes or complements to changes in competition amongst providers. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 ± Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Def Obs Trust Year Mean 
SD 
Min Max 
Overall Between Within 
Efficiency indicator                     
Admissions per bed E 1,498 171 8.76 110 31 25 18 38 319 
Admissions per doctor E 1,499 172 8.72 185 52 47 21 46 463 
Admissions per nurse E 1,499 172 8.72 69 16 14 7 20 119 
Bed occupancy rate (%) E 1,503 172 8.74 86.0 6.3 5.3 3.5 50.5 99.2 
Proportion of day cases (%) E 1,477 169 8.74 30.8 8.6 7.9 3.5 4.6 90.5 
Cancelled elective operations I 1,477 170 8.69 360 288 250 142 6 2426 
Reference cost index I 1,516 173 8.76 100.8 12.9 11.5 5.8 66.0 195.8 
Elective reference cost index I 1,498 171 8.76 100.2 16.5 13.6 9.3 60.5 197.3 
Cleaning services costs (£1,000) I 1,381 159 8.69 2,842 1,823 1,580 901 69 12,941 
Laundry and linen costs (£1,000) I 1,215 143 8.5 807 488 459 160 40 2,864 
Proportion of untouched meals (%) I 1,382 160 8.64 7.6 5.4 3.7 4.0 0.0 49.0 
Measure of market structure                     
Equivalent number of rivals (HHI-1) 3.7 2.5 2.4 0.7 1.0 13.6 
Control variable                     
Percentage of male patients (%) 44.1 4.8 4.7 0.9 14.8 65.3 
Percentage of patients between 0 and 14 years (%) 13.5 13.1 12.9 1.2 0.0 94.2 
Percentage of patients between 15 and 59 years (%) 44.4 8.0 7.8 1.6 5.8 74.3 
Percentage of patients between 60 and 74 years (%) 21.0 5.9 5.7 1.1 0.0 47.0 
Percentage of patients older than 74 years (%) 20.8 6.2 6.1 1.3 0.0 42.8 
Percentage of emergency admissions (%) 35.2 9.6 9.1 2.7 0.2 61.8 
Number of beds 686 382 374 65 31 2,523 
Foundation trust 0.287 0.453 0.301 0.339 0 1 
Market forces factor 1.003 0.074 0.074 0.014 0.886 1.323 
E=positive indicator of efficiency, I=negative indicator of efficiency 
Descriptive statistics for competition measure and control variables are calculated on the admissions per bed's sample. 
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Table 2 ± Competition and efficiency: Model I. 
Regressor 
Log of 
admissions 
per bed 
Log of 
admissions 
per doctor 
Log of 
admissions 
per nurse 
Bed 
occupancy 
rate 
Proportion 
of day 
cases 
Log of 
cancelled 
operations 
Reference 
cost index 
Elective 
reference 
cost index 
Log of 
cleaning 
services 
costs 
Log of 
laundry 
and linen 
costs 
Proportion 
of 
untouched 
meals 
Policy break 2006-07*Pre-reform HHI-1 
0.010 0.009 0.003 0.050 0.377 0.025 -0.306 -0.514 0.0010 -0.005 -0.345 
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.120) (0.119)*** (0.013)** (0.275) (0.392) (0.007) (0.008) (0.171)** 
Proportion of male patients 
-0.002 -0.012 -0.008 -0.042 0.318 -0.036 -0.053 0.109 0.000 -0.002 -0.011 
(0.004) (0.006)** (0.006) (0.152) (0.146)** (0.017)** (0.257) (0.417) (0.009) (0.009) (0.240) 
Proportion of patients between 15 and 59 
0.018 0.015 0.022 -0.047 0.022 -0.017 -0.509 -0.445 0.017 0.005 -0.190 
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.143) (0.120) (0.014) (0.283)* (0.420) (0.010)* (0.007) (0.169) 
Proportion of patients between 60 and 74 
0.012 0.013 0.016 -0.190 1.084 0.011 -0.424 -0.853 0.010 -0.002 -0.271 
(0.006)** (0.007)* (0.007)** (0.205) (0.172)*** (0.021) (0.361) (0.637) (0.011) (0.012) (0.236) 
Proportion of patients beyond 74 
-0.001 0.013 0.011 0.129 -0.299 0.017 -0.200 0.270 0.005 0.021 -0.107 
(0.005) (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.173) (0.144)** (0.019) (0.309) (0.568) (0.012) (0.010)** (0.243) 
Proportion of emergency patients 
-0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.036 -0.643 -0.020 0.006 0.336 0.004 0.000 -0.107 
(0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.003)*** (0.055) (0.055)*** (0.006)*** (0.119) (0.178)* (0.003) (0.003) (0.068) 
Log of beds 
          -0.134     0.124 0.319   
          (0.236)     (0.112) (0.083)***   
Foundation trust 
-0.032 0.005 -0.018 -1.030 -0.509 0.084 -1.691 -29.202 0.014 0.028 -0.274 
(0.012)*** (0.013) (0.011) (0.442)** (0.329) (0.053) (20.431) (27.211) (0.024) (0.029) (0.540) 
Market forces factor 
0.411 0.148 0.337 7.588 -16.464 -0.132 0.309 1.141 -0.335 0.139 -26.864 
(0.278) (0.272) (0.288) (8.876) (9.176)* (1.053) (0.801) (1.438) (0.569) (0.533) (12.628)** 
Constant 
3.674 4.390 3.093 86.820 42.867 8.842 137.249 143.006 6.178 3.530 53.140 
(0.473)*** (0.519)*** (0.577)*** (15.364)*** (13.897)*** (2.246)*** (29.858)*** (47.606)*** (1.310)*** (0.989)*** (17.972)*** 
SUR estimation. All regressions control for hospital and year fixed effects. 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value=0.000 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3 ± Competition and admissions, beds, doctors, and nurses: Model I. 
Regressor Log of 
admissions Log of beds 
Log of 
doctors 
Log of 
nurses 
Policy break 2006/07*Pre-reform HHI-1 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 0.003 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Proportion of male patients -0.012 -0.009 0.002 -0.002 
(0.006)** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion of patients between 15 and 59 0.029 0.004 0.004 -0.002 
(0.009)*** (0.003) (0.003)* (0.003) 
Proportion of patients between 60 and 74 0.022 0.004 0.000 -0.003 
(0.010)** (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion of patients beyond 74 0.009 0.014 -0.003 0.000 
(0.005) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion of emergency patients -0.006 0.002 0.000 0.001 
(0.002)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foundation trust 0.012 0.040 0.004 0.027 
(0.011) (0.012)*** (0.012) (0.009)*** 
Market forces factor -0.031 -0.430 -0.150 -0.332 
(0.256) (0.214)** (0.216) (0.216) 
Constant 9.852 6.589 5.755 7.348 
(0.586)*** (0.316)*** (0.307)*** (0.335)*** 
Observations 1,498 1,498 1,499 1,499 
Number of trusts 171 171 172 172 
Average 73,651 686 420 1,093 
OLS estimation of Model I. All regressions control for hospital and year fixed effects. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 4 ± Competition quartiles and efficiency: Model II. 
Efficiency indicator 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Log of admissions per bed 0.010 0.025 0.053 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)** 
Log of admissions per doctor 0.017 0.058 0.049 (0.019) (0.019)*** (0.026)* 
Log of admissions per nurse 0.022 0.047 0.024 (0.019) (0.020)** (0.026) 
Bed occupancy rate 0.540 1.285 0.961 (0.662) (0.693)* (0.814) 
Proportion of day cases 0.796 1.073 2.108 (0.626) (0.501)** (0.747)*** 
Log of cancelled elective operations -0.024 0.085 0.113 (0.079) (0.080) (0.084) 
Reference cost index -0.363 -2.691 -1.925 (1.147) (0.997)*** (1.493) 
Elective reference cost index 2.491 -2.322 -3.354 (1.940) (1.983) (1.971)* 
Log of cleaning services costs 
-0.037 -0.052 -0.021 
(0.038) (0.047) (0.045) 
Log of laundry and linen costs 0.056 -0.008 0.019 (0.054) (0.046) (0.046) 
Proportion of untouched meals -1.321 -1.819 -2.161 (0.911) (0.948)* (1.038)** 
SUR estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control 
for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, foundation trusts, and market 
forces factor. The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services 
costs, and laundry and linen costs also control for beds. 
Quartile dummies are constructed on the pre-reform HHI-1: 2nd quartile=low-
competition market, 3rd quartile=high-competition market, 4th quartile=very high-
competition market; 1st quartile=very low-competition market (reference category). 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value=0.000 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 5 ± Competition and efficiency: with time varying competition. 
Regressor 
Log of 
admissions 
per bed 
Log of 
admissions 
per doctor 
Log of 
admissions 
per nurse 
Bed 
occupancy 
rate 
Proportion 
of day cases 
Log of 
cancelled 
operations 
Reference 
cost index 
Elective 
reference 
cost index 
Log of 
cleaning 
services 
costs 
Log of 
laundry and 
linen costs 
Proportion 
of 
untouched 
meals 
Model III 
Policy break*HHI-1 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.048 0.326 0.020 -0.186 -0.421 0.002 -0.0001 -0.255 (0.004)** (0.004)* (0.004) (0.110) (0.106)*** (0.011)* (0.220) (0.339) (0.006) (0.007) (0.156) 
HHI-1 
0.006 0.005 0.008 0.028 -0.277 -0.002 -0.556 -0.385 -0.019 -0.013 -0.150 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.208) (0.170) (0.026) (0.370) (0.712) (0.011)* (0.015) (0.306) 
Model IV 
Dummy 2002-03*HHI-1 -0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.003 -0.245 -0.016 0.122 -0.532 0.024 0.012 0.569 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.214) (0.178) (0.034) (0.460) (0.713) (0.015) (0.012) (0.317)* 
Dummy 2003-04*HHI-1 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.025 -0.133 -0.018 -0.129 -0.268 -0.007 0.017 0.180 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.145) (0.137) (0.020) (0.269) (0.489) (0.018) (0.010)* (0.225) 
Dummy 2004-05*HHI-1 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.039 -0.034 -0.024 -0.094 0.204 0.004 -0.007 0.348 (0.003) (0.003)* (0.003) (0.105) (0.087) (0.013)* (0.190) (0.383) (0.007) (0.009) (0.192)* 
Dummy 2006-07*HHI-1 0.004 0.004 0.000 -0.220 0.159 0.009 0.014 -0.194 0.008 0.002 0.116 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.099)** (0.087)* (0.009) (0.258) (0.354) (0.006) (0.006) (0.114) 
Dummy 2007-08*HHI-1 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.196 0.236 0.024 -0.603 -0.542 -0.004 0.000 0.077 (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.004) (0.170) (0.139)* (0.014)* (0.255)** (0.381) (0.010) (0.009) (0.152) 
Dummy 2008-09*HHI-1 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.206 0.289 0.023 -0.204 -0.529 0.007 0.001 -0.010 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.205) (0.114)** (0.015) (0.250) (0.446) (0.006) (0.009) (0.253) 
Dummy 2009-10*HHI-1 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.347 -0.003 -0.189 -0.545 0.004 0.002 -0.372 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.161) (0.127)*** (0.019) (0.253) (0.480) (0.006) (0.009) (0.199)* 
Dummy 2010-11*HHI-1 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.153 0.418 -0.018 -0.356 -0.691 0.005 0.007 -0.352 (0.005)*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.174) (0.156)*** (0.018) (0.279) (0.489) (0.007) (0.009) (0.193)* 
HHI-1 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.052 -0.359 0.014 -0.504 -0.554 -0.017 -0.009 -0.088 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.228) (0.186)* (0.028) (0.401) (0.737) (0.013) (0.016) (0.334) 
SUR estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, number of beds, foundation trusts, and 
market forces factor. The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs also control for beds. 
Post-reform effect of market structure (p-value) in Model III (ȕį). Log of admissions per bed: 0.015 (0.011); log of admissions per doctor: 0.012 (0.020); log of admissions per 
nurse: 0.010 (0.094); bed occupancy rate: 0.076 (0.726); proportion of day cases: 0.049 (0.771); log of cancelled operations: 0.018 (0.481); proportion of untouched meals: -0.405 
(0.161); log of cleaning services costs: -0.017 (0.117); log of laundry and linen costs: -0.013 (0.357); reference cost index: -0.742 (0.101); elective reference cost index: -0.806 
(0.215). 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value=0.000. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 6 ± Effects of competition at different efficiency quantiles: Model V. 
Efficiency indicator 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Log of admissions per bed 
0.019 0.022 0.002 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.015) (0.011)** (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Log of admissions per doctor 
-0.003 -0.004 0.013 0.018 0.016 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.005)** (0.006)*** (0.007)** 
Log of admissions per nurse 
0.033 0.019 -0.005 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.024) (0.011)* (0.006) (0.005)** (0.007) 
Bed occupancy rate 
0.461 0.147 -0.079 -0.183 -0.211 
(0.408) (0.190) (0.148) (0.191) (0.252) 
Proportion of day cases 
0.914 0.396 0.220 0.101 0.277 
(0.372)** (0.201)** (0.202) (0.255) (0.377) 
Log of cancelled elective operations 
0.072 0.035 0.011 0.017 0.041 
(0.037)** (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) 
Reference cost index 
-0.419 -0.319 -0.233 -0.532 0.062 
(0.281) (0.248) (0.250) (0.424) (1.068) 
Elective reference cost index 
0.295 -0.316 -0.395 -0.390 -1.934 
(0.501) (0.386) (0.487) (0.742) (1.592) 
Log of cleaning services costs 
0.018 -0.037 -0.031 -0.007 0.053 
(0.036) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.035) 
Log of laundry and linen costs 
-0.075 -0.021 0.010 -0.018 0.016 
(0.046) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.032) 
Proportion of untouched meals 
-0.076 -0.196 -0.168 -0.429 -0.627 
(0.160) (0.128) (0.144) (0.245)* (0.469) 
Unconditional quantile regression. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control for 
gender, age categories, emergency admissions, number of beds, foundation trusts, and market forces 
factor. The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen 
costs also control for beds. 
Bootstrapped clustered standard errors (using 1,000 replications) in parenthesis. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Figure 1 ± Trend in the efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 20010/11. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 ± Pairwise correlations across efficiency indicators. 
Efficiency indicator Def (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Log of admissions per bed E 1.0000                     
(2) Log of admissions per doctor E 0.2909* 1.0000                   
(3) Log of admissions per nurse E 0.5588* 0.7586* 1.0000                 
(4) Bed occupancy rate E 0.2018* 0.0595 0.2277* 1.0000               
(5) Proportion of day cases E 0.1028* -0.0501 0.1446* -0.1041* 1.0000             
(6) Log of cancelled elective operations I -0.0181 0.0087 0.0946* 0.1674* 0.0551 1.0000           
(7) Reference cost index I -0.2197* -0.6242* -0.5829* -0.1566* 0.0982* -0.1022* 1.0000         
(8) Elective reference cost index I -0.2575* -0.5555* -0.5562* -0.1590* -0.045 -0.1227* 0.7412* 1.0000       
(9) Log of cleaning services costs I 0.2821* -0.0819 0.0714 0.2116* -0.1088* 0.5955* -0.055 -0.0904* 1.0000     
(10) Log of laundry and linen costs I 0.1926* 0.1030* 0.1848* 0.3147* -0.2760* 0.6670* -0.1696* -0.1776* 0.8133* 1.0000   
(11) Proportion of untouched meals I 0.0405 -0.0234 -0.0542 0.0159 -0.0199 0.0134 -0.0121 -0.0267 -0.002 0.0185 1.0000 
E=positive indicator of efficiency, I=negative indicator of efficiency 
* = statistically significant at 5% level after Bonferroni adjustment 
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Table A2 ± Unconditional quantiles of the efficiency indicators. 
Efficiency indicator 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Admissions per bed 75 91 109 126 142 
Admissions per doctor 115 151 190 218 243 
Admissions per nurse 48 58 71 79 87 
Bed occupancy rate 78.2 82.8 86.6 90.2 93.3 
Proportion of day cases 22.1 26.4 30.0 34.6 39.1 
Cancelled elective operations 86 154 284 475 763 
Reference cost index 88.2 92.6 98.0 106.3 116.2 
Elective reference cost index 82.2 88.9 97.2 108.6 122.6 
Cleaning services costs 987  1,547  2,440  3,676  5,207  
Laundry and linen costs 280  465  709  1,052  1,430  
Proportion of untouched meals 2.4 4.2 6.4 9.6 14.5 
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Table A3 ± Competition, admissions, beds, doctors, and nurses. 
Regressor Model Log of 
admissions 
Log of 
beds 
Log of 
doctors 
Log of 
nurses 
Policy break 2006-07*HHI-
1
 
III 
0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.003 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
HHI-1 
0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 
(0.007) (0.004)* (0.004) (0.004)** 
            
Dummy 2002-03*HHI-1 
IV 
-0.008 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)* 
Dummy 2003-04*HHI-1 
0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dummy 2004-05*HHI-1 
-0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)* 
Dummy 2006-07*HHI-1 
0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.003 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)* 
Dummy 2007-08*HHI-1 
0.002 -0.006 -0.007 0.001 
(0.004) (0.003)** (0.005) (0.003) 
Dummy 2008-09*HHI-1 
-0.003 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.003)** (0.004) (0.003) 
Dummy 2009-10*HHI-1 
-0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004)* (0.004) (0.003) 
Dummy 2010-11*HHI-1 
0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004) 
HHI-1 
0.002 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Observations   1,498 1,498 1,499 1,499 
Number of trusts 
  
171 171 172 172 
Average 
  
73,651 686 420 1,093 
OLS estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control for 
gender, age categories, emergency admissions, foundation trusts, and market forces factor. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A4 ± Data sources. 
  Source 
Efficiency indicator   
Admissions, day cases https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/hospital-admitted-patient-
care-activity 
Doctors 
Data provided by NHS Digital until 2009/10. 2010/11 data available on: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/nhs-workforce-statistics-
medical-and-dental-staff/nhs-staff-2000-2010-medical-and-dental. Doctors includes all 
medical staff such as consultants, associate specialists, specialty doctors, staff grade doctors, 
doctors in training, hospital practitioners/clinical assistants, and other doctors. Nurses 
comprise nurses, midwiferies, and health visiting staff. 
Nurses 
Data provided by NHS Digital until 2009/10. 2010/11 data available on: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/nhs-workforce-statistics-
non-medical-staff/nhs-staff-2000-2010-non-medical. Nurses comprise nurses, midwiferies, 
and health visiting staff. 
Beds, bed occupancy rate https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/bed-availability-and-
occupancy/bed-data-overnight/  
Cancelled elective operations https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/cancelled-elective-
operations/cancelled-ops-data/  
Reference cost index 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorganisati
on/NHScostingmanual/DH_129310?PageOperation=email  
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs  
Cleaning services costs, 
laundry and linen costs, 
proportion of untouched meals 
http://hefs.hscic.gov.uk/DataFiles.asp. Cleaning services costs include all pay (e.g. salaries) 
and non-pay (e.g. equipment) costs for both in house or contracted out cleaning services. 
Laundry and linen costs are defined in a similar way  
Covariate   
Patient gender, age, 
emergency admissions 
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/hospital-admitted-patient-
care-activity 
Foundation trusts http://hefs.hscic.gov.uk/DataFiles.asp  
Market forces factor 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorganisati
on/NHScostingmanual/DH_129310?PageOperation=email  
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs  
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Table A5 ± (i) Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Eigenvalue Difference 
Proportion 
explained 
variance 
Cumulative 
Principal Component 1 (PC 1) 3.38 1.05 0.31 0.31 
Principal Component 2 (PC 2) 2.33 1.10 0.21 0.52 
Principal Component 3 (PC 3) 1.23 0.18 0.11 0.63 
Principal Component 4 (PC 4) 1.05 0.11 0.10 0.73 
Principal Component 5 (PC 5) 0.93 0.20 0.09 0.81 
Principal Component 6 (PC 6) 0.73 0.24 0.07 0.88 
Principal Component 7 (PC 7) 0.49 0.17 0.04 0.92 
Principal Component 8 (PC 8) 0.33 0.13 0.03 0.95 
Principal Component 9 (PC 9) 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.97 
Principal Component 10 (PC 10) 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.99 
Principal Component 11 (PC 11) 0.16 - 0.01 1.00 
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Table A6 ± (ii) Correlations Principal Component Analysis. 
Correlations 
Efficiency indicator PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 PC 6 PC 7 PC 8 PC 9 PC 10 PC 11 
Log of admissions per bed 0.29 -0.03 0.54 0.12 0.10 0.59 -0.13 -0.42 0.01 0.23 -0.10 
Log of admissions per doctor 0.42 -0.25 -0.20 -0.09 0.12 0.08 0.47 0.24 0.05 0.54 0.35 
Log of admissions per nurse 0.47 -0.12 0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.18 0.30 0.28 0.07 -0.72 -0.13 
Bed occupancy rate 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.42 -0.84 -0.12 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.12 
Proportion of day cases 0.11 -0.01 0.70 -0.25 0.14 -0.59 0.00 0.19 -0.09 0.14 -0.05 
Log of cancelled elective operations 0.18 0.49 -0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.25 0.47 -0.62 -0.07 -0.10 0.03 
Reference cost index -0.45 0.15 0.26 -0.06 0.04 0.15 0.33 0.07 0.73 -0.03 0.19 
Elective reference cost index -0.44 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.45 0.24 -0.62 0.03 -0.10 
Log of cleaning services costs 0.15 0.56 0.06 -0.04 0.10 0.15 -0.33 0.26 -0.13 -0.11 0.64 
Log of laundry and linen costs 0.20 0.55 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.36 0.20 0.28 -0.61 
Proportion of untouched meals 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.85 0.47 -0.18 0.08 0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.01 
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A1. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE POLICY 
Cost saving on cancelled elective operations. We find that patient choice increases cancelled 
elective operations and this may reflect lower efficiency in the management of the patients. An 
alternative interpretation is that this is the result of hospital managers implementing strategies 
to increase the utilisation of operating theatres by booking elective operations closer to full 
capacity. As a result, any delay in the duration of a surgery (e.g. due to complications) increases 
the probability that the surgery of other scheduled elective patients is cancelled. Moreover, 
after the introduction of the patient choice policy and until 2009/10, hospitals received a tariff 
payment even if the elective operation was cancelled (Cookson et al., 2017). We are however 
unable to quantify the effect on cancelled elective operations because of the lack of information 
on the utilisation of operating theatres. More cancelled elective operations may generate also a 
loss in patient benefits since elective patients will wait more after the cancellation of their 
operation. Also in this case, however, we have no information to evaluate such a loss. 
 
Cost saving on doctors. The average doctors salary is calculated by averaging the total amount 
of basic pay over the total amount of worked full time equivalent units using the data available 
at: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/nhs-staff-earnings-
estimates/nhs-staff-earnings-estimates-january-march-2011. 
 
Average cost of day case and elective patients. We calculate the average costs of elective 
and day case patients using 2010/11 reference costs data at HRG level. These averages are 
calculated on only those HRG codes that are used to classify both elective and day case patients 
within each hospital. The costs of elective patients and the number of elective patients averaged 
across 113,505 HRGs across all hospitals are £24,787 (standard deviation £118,286) and 10 
(standard deviation 32), respectively. The costs of day cases and the number of day cases 
averaged across 118,285 HRGs across all hospitals are £26,027 (standard deviation £118,184) 
and 39 (standard deviation 175), respectively. The average costs of elective patients are 
calculated dividing the total costs of elective patients across all hospitals by the total number 
of elective patients across all hospitals. The total cost of elective patients across all hospitals 
amounts to £24.8bn and the total number of elective patients across all hospitals is 1.2 million, 
so the average costs of elective patients are equal to £2,435. Similarly, the average costs of day 
cases are calculated dividing the total costs of day cases across all hospitals by the total number 
of day cases across all hospitals. The total cost of day cases across all hospitals amounts to 
£3.1bn and the total number of elective patients across all hospitals is 4.6 million, so the 
average costs of day cases are equal to £670. 
 
Cost savings on admissions per bed. We calculate the cost savings due to the effect of the 
choice policy on admissions per bed using the same approach of Section 4.2 (i.e. we calculate 
the effect at the sample mean using ME , where 3.7M  ). Patient choice increases admissions 
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per bed by 4.1% (0.011×3.7). Given that the choice policy does not affect the number of 
admissions, admissions per bed may increases because of a reduction in the number of beds. 
We estimate that patient choice reduces the number of beds by 1.9% (0.005×3.7). The average 
hospital has 686 beds and, therefore, the choice policy reduces its number of beds by 13 beds 
(1.9%×686). The cost of a hospital bed as £400 per day according the Department of Health 
(BBC news, 2017). If 13 beds are occupied in proportion to the average bed occupancy rate 
(86%) in each day of the year, then the cost saving effect of competition for the average hospital 
is £1.632m (£400×365×13×0.86). However, the reduction in beds is likely to be due precisely 
to the increase in the proportion of day cases discussed in Section 4.2. To avoid double 
counting, we therefore do not include the cost savings that arise from a reduction in beds. 
 
Cost savings on percentage of untouched meals. We calculate the average daily cost of 
feeding a patient using the Hospital Estates and Facilities Statistics in 2010/11 (which can be 
found at http://hefs.hscic.gov.uk/DataFiles.asp). Across the 167 acute hospital trusts in 
2010/11, such costs are on average £8.29 (standard deviation £2.76) with the lowest and highest 
cost being £2.57 and £17.46, respectively. In the calculation of cost savings in Section 4.2, we 
assume that for each untouched meal hospitals serve a replacement meal of a similar cost that 
EHWWHUILWVSDWLHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHV. This assumption is likely to hold true because hospitals want 
to feed patients to speed up their recovery (Jeffrey, 2014), and also to avoid potential greater 
costs due to compensations for those patients who decide to buy their preferred meal privately 
(Daily Mail Reporter, 2011). 
 
Average total costs. We calculate the average total costs using reference costs data in 2010/11. 
Total costs include inpatient, outpatient, and emergency care activity, and the average is 
calculated across all existing 167 acute hospital trusts in 2010/11. The average of the total costs 
is £236.7m with a median of £203.7m, which indicates a right-skewed distribution as showed 
in the figure below. The total hospital costs amount to 39.534bn in 2010/11. 
 
Average number of hospitals. We calculate the average number of hospitals using the 
Reference Cost Index data for all analysed years because they have the lowest number of 
missing observations. More precisely, there are 176 acute trusts in 2002/03, 173 from 2003/04 
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to 2005/06, 171 in 2006/07, 169 in 2007/08 and 2008/09, 166 in 2009/10, and 167 in 2010/11. 
Hence, there are on average 171 acute hospital trusts from 2002/03 to 2010/11. 
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A2. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
Appendix Table A5 of the Appendix shows the results of a Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) on our eleven efficiency indicators. PCA is generally used as a dimensionality-reduction 
technique because it helps summarise variables that are strongly correlated to each other in a 
single or few components. The first of the principal components captures the highest proportion 
of variability across all variables while the last component captures the lowest proportion. PCA 
shows that the first principal component captures only a relatively small share, i.e. 31%, of the 
overall variation in the eleven efficiency indicators that we use. A large number of components 
(up to the first six components) needs to be used to capture 88% of the total variation. This 
finding is in line with Appendix Table A1 of the Appendix which shows that there exists from 
low to moderate correlation between our eleven efficiency indicators.  
In addition, PCA allows us to further investigate which efficiency indicators may generate 
higher cost savings. We observe for example that the first component, i.e. the one capturing 
the largest variability, is moderately correlated with admissions per nurse (47%). This indicates 
a higher variability in this indicator compared to the other indicators. An increase in admissions 
per nurse might therefore generate relatively higher savings. Considering the indicators on 
which competition has a statistically significant effect, proportion of day cases is strongly 
correlated (70%) with the third principal component, proportion of untouched meals is strongly 
correlated (85%) with the fourth principal component, cancelled elective operations is 
correlated (47%) with the seventh principal component, and admissions per doctor is correlated 
(54%) with the tenth principal components. Hence, savings produced by an increase in 
proportion of day cases might be greater than those generated by a reduction in untouched 
meals, cancelled elective operations, and admissions per doctor. Such a result is in line with 
our evaluation of the cost savings. 
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A3. COMPETITION, QUALITY AND COST REDUCING EFFORT 
Hospital managers choose quality q and effort e to maximise a quasi-altruistic utility 
function: 
 ( , ; , ) ( ( , ; , ), ) ( )V q e b u y q e b e h qT T D  , (7) 
ZKHUHWKHKRVSLWDO¶VLQFRPHLV: 
 ( , ; , ) ( , ; ) ( , ) ( ( , ), , )y q e b b q e b pD q c D q q eT S T T T     , (8) 
with Dq>0, Dș<0, Dqș>0 and cD>0, cq>0, ce<0. ș is a measure of competition: more competition 
reduces demand (more rivals serve the same population) and increases the responsiveness of 
demand to quality. b is exogenous and could be interpreted as a direct grant from 
commissioners, a lump sum tax or subsidy (or we could get similar results by assuming the 
hospital is subject to a minimum profit constraint S(q,e,șb). h(q) is intrinsic utility from 
quality and is increasing and concave in quality. Į LV WKH GHJUHH RI DOWUXLVP u(y,e) is 
increasing in y, decreasing in e and concave and profit is concave in q and e. Additional effort 
reduces cost and the marginal cost of quality and output (cqe<0, cDe<0). 
This note investigates the effect of greater demand responsiveness to quality (ș), which we 
interpret, in line with the literature, as an increase in competition, on effort and we interpret an 
increase in e as an increase in efficiency. 
First order conditions on quality and effort are: 
 [( ) ] 0q y q q y D q q qV u h u p c D c hS D D       , (9) 
 [ ] 0e y e e y e eV u u u c uS      , (10) 
and the responses of q and e to an increase in a parameter z (z=ș or b or p) satisfy: 
 
/
/
qq qe qz
eq ee ez
V V Vq z
V V Ve z
w wª º ª ºª º  « » « »« » w w¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¬ ¼
, (11) 
and so: 
 
1
1
/ ,
/ ,
qz eq ez qq
ez eq qz ee
e z V V V V
q z V V V V


ª ºw w  ' ¬ ¼
ª ºw w  ' ¬ ¼
  (12) 
where the determinant ǻ = [VqqVeeVeqVqe]>0 by the concavity of V. 
Solving for the effects of an income shock (b) an increase in competition (ș) we have (see 
table of derivatives overleaf): 
 
1/ qb eq eb qqe b V V V V
 ª ºw w  ' ¬ ¼ , (13) 
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y q eq e qq
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e b u V V
T T T T T T
T T T
T T T
T S S S S
S S S
S S S
 


ª ºª ºw w  '   '     ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º '     ¬ ¼
ª º w w  ' ¬ ¼
 (14) 
Thus the effect of greater competition can be decomposed as the sum of an income effect 
and a substitution effect due to the change in the marginal profitability of effort and quality. 
Making the usual assumptions that leisure is a normal good (effort is an inferior good) and 
remembering that Sș = pDș<0, the income effect of greater competition is to increase effort. 
The sign of the substitution effect due to the changes in marginal profitability is the sign 
of: 
 q eq e qq q yy e q y qe ye e e qqV V u u u VT T T TS S S S S S S S
        ª º    « »« »¬ ¼
  (15) 
Even if we assume that STș>0 so that, if effort is not a choice variable, a pure profit 
maximiser would increase quality when competition increases, this expression is ambiguously 
signed. If we assume utility is linear in income and additively separable in income and effort 
(so that the income effect is zero) the sign of the effect (only a substitution effect) of 
competition is: 
     ?sgn / sgn sgnq eq e qq q eq e qqe V V VT T T TT S S S S S  § ·w w    ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹   (16) 
Hence if we assume STș =  (pcD )Dqș(cDD+cqD)Dș>0 (competition increases quality 
holding effort constant) then competition increases effort. 
The objective of our model is to highlight the effects that arise from a higher demand 
responsiveness to quality, captured by the parameter (ș). In our simplified model we do not 
allow for strategic interaction between hospitals, nor for the entry or exit stimulated by changes 
in policy. Doing so would complicate the derivation of results (see, for example, Brekke et al., 
2011, Gravelle et al., 2016) but would not alter the key insights from the simpler model: the 
effects policy changes depend on the preferences of providers, especially their degree of 
altruism, and the properties of their cost functions. 
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General case: V = u(y,e)+Įh(q), y =  b+S(q,e) Profit: S(q,e) =  pD(q,ș)  c(D(q,ș),q,e) 
Vqe =  uyySeSq +  uySqe +  uyeSe Sq =  (pcD )Dq  cq 0, iff Į  
Vqb = uyySq 0 iff Į  Se =  ce >  0 
Vqș =  uyySqSș +  uySTș= VqbSș +  uySTș Sqe =  ceDDq  ceq >  0 
Veb =  uyySe +uey Sș =  pDș <  0 
Veș =  uyySeSș +ueySș +  uySHș =  VebSș +  uySHș Sqș = (pcD )Dqș  (cDD +  cqD)Dș  
 Seș =  ceDDș <  0 
Utility linear in income: u(y,e) =  y  f(e) Įh(q) 
Vqe =  Sqe   
Vqb = 0   
Vqș =  STș  
Veb =  0  
Veș =  SHș   
 
